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HARD-CORE PORNOGRAPHY: A 
PROPOSAL FOR A PER SE RULE 
Bruce A. Taylor* 
Public opinion polls reveal that many American people want 
the government to crack down harder on pornography and to 
restrict access to pornography that meets the legal standard of 
obscenity.1 The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that ob-
scenity is without first amendment protection.2 Why, then, does 
the problem of hard-core pornography persist? The Attorney 
General's Commission on Pornography concluded in 1986 that 
hard-core pornography flourishes in violation of existing laws 
due to "underinvestigation, underprosecution, and under-
sentencing. "8 This Article suggests that those findings are mere 
symptoms of a more severe ailment. A more fundamental prob-
lem is the complexity of the legal test for obscenity, which leads 
to discouragement of law enforcement efforts and inconsistent 
judicial rulings. 
Part I of this Article discusses the history and pervasiveness 
of the pornography problem. Part II explains the current legal 
test for obscenity, as evolved from Miller v. California,• with an 
emphasis on terms commonly used in the definition of obscenity. 
• Vice President and General Counsel, Citizens for Decency Through Law, Inc. 
(CDL), Phoenix, Arizona; Former Assistant Prosecutor and Assistant Director of Law 
and Special Prosecutor for obscenity cases for the City of Cleveland, Ohio. B.A., Univer-
sity of Vermont, 1972; J.D., Cleveland State University, 1974. I wish to thank Len Mun-
sil, J.D., 1988, Arizona State University, who is clerking for CDL, and who used his skills 
as editor of his university and law school newspapers to edit this work and conform its 
style to proper form. I also thank the staff of the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform for its patience, help, and for the wonderful opportunity to participate in this 
symposium. 
1. See Pornography: A Poll, TIME, July 21, 1986, at 22 [hereinafter TIME Poll]; Poll: 
Mixed Feelings on Pornography, NEWSWEEK Mar. 18, 1985, at 60; The Gallup Poll, Aug. 
14, 1986; The Gallup Poll, Apr. 3, 1977. For a legal definition of obscenity, see infra text 
accompanying note 27. 
2. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically 
settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.") 
(citations omitted). See also Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 (1986); Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 571-72 (1942). 
3. 1 A'l"l'ORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FINAL RE-
PORT 367 (1986) [hereinafter COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY]. 
4. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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Part III examines the problems in applying Miller that suggest 
that the application of a per se hard-core pornography rule may 
be appropriate. Finally, Part IV presents a proposal for a per se 
hard-core pornography rule, similar to child pornography laws 
existing in many jurisdictions and upheld by the Supreme Court 
in New York v. Ferber." This Article concludes that Congress 
and the state legislatures should adopt an objective definition of 
obscenity that would make commercial distribution of all hard-
core pornography per se illegal. Such laws would remove most of 
the confusion regarding what material is legal or illegal, provid-
ing a clear definitional line for producers and merchants. Prose-
cution of violators would become more frequent and efficient. 
Eventually, the bulk of the illegal pornography industry's prosti-
tution-based trade8 would become unmarketable, and, like child 
pornography, retreat into an underground culture far from the 
general public. 
l. THE PROLIFERATION OF ILLEGAL HARD-CORE PORNOGRAPHY 
Prosecutors and lawyers, including the author, who are exper-
ienced in obscenity cases, have witnessed many changes in the 
past fifteen years. In the mid 1970's, when a judge informed a 
panel of prospective jurors that the case involved obscenity, 
many immediately thought of Penthouse, Hustler, and other 
men's magazines sold at convenience stores and on newsstands. 
Few had been exposed to hard-core pornography, which shows 
things they had only heard about-explicit photographs of ac-
tual sex acts, including everything from blood, to goats, to 
groups. Many female jurors did not want to see such hard-core 
pornography and were excused as unable to be fair and impar-
tial. If the name of the movie or magazine suggested homosexu-
ality, many men also did not want to see the material. 
Despite walkouts by potential jurors who were qualified but 
did not wish to view the evidence, the jurors who did serve usu-
ally voted to convict. Though most people had seen Playboy and 
some nudity and simulated sex in R-rated movies, the explicit 
material that could only be obtained at "dirty" bookstores or 
viewed at "adult" theatres still met with universal disapproval 
5. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
6. The production of explicit pornography normally involves prostitution-like pay-
ment of money for sexual performances, as discussed infra in Part IV. See infra notes 
140-41. 
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in courts of law. Those cities that actively prosecuted obscenity 
cases obtained convictions in almost every trial in which they 
managed to get a jury verdict. 7 Several convictions were ob-
tained in state and federal courts in California.8 Then, a series of 
acquittals and hung juries in the Los Angeles area in 1976 and 
1977 prompted prosecutors there to abandon enforcement ex-
cept for violent, animal, and child pornography cases. 9 That sur-
render in Los Angeles, along with lack of enforcement in New 
York City, contributed greatly to the growth in the availability 
of hard-core pornography in America, because the pornography 
syndicate produces almost all hard-core films, videos, and 
magazines in those cities. 10 This substantial industry provides 
soft, medium, and hard-core pornography to cable, subscription, 
and satellite television services; dial-porn telephone services; 
convenience stores; "adult" bookstores and theatres; mail-order 
services; and now video stores. A majority of Americans now 
have been exposed to some form of pornography.11 .Currently, a 
panel of prospective jurors is likely to include several members 
who have seen hard-core, X-rated material, probably from 
videocassette rentals.12 Prosecutors now expect to have several 
"conservative" and "religious" people excused and to have a few 
people serve on the trial jury who have been customers or view-
ers. The criminal trial juries of the 1980's are judging material 
they have seen in their private lives, whereas juries in the 1960's 
7. For example, Cincinnati, Buffalo, Atlanta, Boston, Norfolk, Arlington, Houston, 
Omaha, and Cleveland, along with many cities in states including Florida, Illinois, Texas, 
the Carolinas, Colorado, Washington, Utah, New York, Indiana, Kentucky, and Michigan 
have enjoyed great success in eliminating pornography from their communities. See infra 
note 13. 
8. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 
(1977); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 
(1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
9. Interview by author with Stephen Trott, then U.S. Attorney for the Central Dis-
trict of California and former Deputy District Attorney for Los Angeles County (March 
26, 1984). Mr. Trott was a distinguished trial prosecutor, became Associate Attorney 
General of the United States, and has been appointed by President Reagan to the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
10. In 1986, the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography reported that at 
least 80% of hard-core tapes, films, and devices are produced in Los Angeles County. 2 
CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 1366. The Commission also reported that up 
to 90% of the pornography industry is controlled by organized crime families. Id. at 
1048-49 (statement of Daryl F. Gates, Chief of Los Angeles Police Dep't). The control of 
these families has historically been in New York City. See generally id. at 1037-1238 
(chapter on organized crime). The "pornography syndicate" is a law enforcement trade 
term for the collection of producers, directors, performers, and distributors who make 
and market hard-core, explicit films and magazines. 
11. TIME Poll, supra note 1. 
12. Id. 
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and 1970's were judging material they had never seen before. 
Nevertheless, based upon this author's experience, convictions 
are obtained in approximately seventy to ninety percent of the 
cases currently tried. 13 
Hard-core pornography has permeated local communities to 
the extent that now many cities and counties have some sort of 
traffic in such magazines or videos.14 In the early 1970's, hard-
core material was available only in the "adult" bookstores and 
theatres in the downtowns of America's largest cities.16 By the 
late 1970's, these pornography outlets were in most large metro-
politan areas.16 In the last five years, hard-core films on video 
cassettes have become available in a majority of the otherwise 
legitimate video stores and chains in the United States.17 For the 
first time, the pornography syndicate can distribute its products 
without owning the retail outlets. The businesspersons who own 
video stores are not the syndicate-controlled people found in 
13. No figures have been compiled on the total percentage of convictions obtained in 
obscenity proceedings. This approximation by the author is based on 15 years of obscen-
ity law enforcement experience. As Assistant Prosecutor in Cleveland, the author ob-
tained more than 400 convictions for pandering obscenity and authored over 100 appeal 
briefs in obscenity cases. A2J General Counsel with Citizens for Decency Through Law, 
the author for 10 years has travelled the country conducting workshops for police and 
prosecutors on the prosecution of obscenity and has assisted in dozens of obscenity trials 
and appeals throughout the United States. In all, this author has tried over 65 obscenity 
jury cases in several states and has argued over 50 appeals before the Ohio Court of 
Appeals, the Ohio and Colorado Supreme Courts, United States Courts of Appeals for 
the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, and the United States Supreme Court. See Flynt v. Ohio, 
451 U.S. 619 (1981), dismissing cert. after oral argument in State v. Flynt, 63 Ohio St. 
2d 132, 407 N.E.2d 15 (1980); Turoso v. Cleveland Mun. Court, 674 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 674 F.2d 484 (6th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 864 (1982); People v. New Horizons, Inc., 200 Colo. 377, 
616 P.2d 106 (1980); State v. Burgun, 56 Ohio St. 2d 354, 384 N.E.2d 255 (1978). This 
firsthand experience puts the author in a unique position to comment on the success of 
obscenity prosecutions nationwide. For a discussion of the effect of Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15 (1973), on the number of obscenity prosecutions, see Project, An Empirical 
Inquiry into the Effects of Miller v. California on the Control of Obscenity, 52 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 810 (1977). 
14. See The Pornography Industry, Boston Globe, Feb. 13-18, 1983. 
15. See COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 7-21 (1970) [hereinafter OBSCENITY REPORT]. 
16. The Pornography Industry, supra note 14. Compare OBSCENITY REPORT, supra 
note 15, at 7-21 with 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 277. 
"In sixteen years there have been numerous changes in the social, political, legal, 
cultural, and religious portrait of the United States, and many of these changes 
have undeniably involved both sexuality and the public portrayal of sexuality. 
With reference to the question of pornography, therefore, there can be no doubt 
that we confront a different world than that confronted by the 1970 
Commission. 
1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 226. 
17. The Pornography Industry, supra note 14. 
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"adult" bookstores and theatres. Video store owners sell the 
same illegal product as "adult" bookstores and theatre owners 
sell, however, and therefore video store owners must be prose-
cuted. But "Mom and Pop" video store owners and employees 
have a better public image and are more sympathetic defend-
ants. They present a different trial problem for prosecutors than 
"adult" bookstore employees, whom the public generally per-
ceives as sleazy. Law enforcement efforts must, however, con-
tinue to focus on the obscene material itself, rather than on the 
salespersons. 
Today's "adult" videos are the same hard-core films previ-
ously available only in the industry's own bookstores and thea-
tres. As the Supreme Court stated in Miller v. California, what 
was euphemistically called "adult" material in that case in-
cluded magazines and a film "very explicitly depicting men and 
women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual 
activities, with genitals often prominently displayed.ms The 
materials at issue in Orange County, California, in the Miller 
case were examples of hard-core pornography that state and fed-
eral courts historically have condemned as obscene and unpro-
tected by the first amendment. This same hard-core pornogra-
phy is what is usually meant by the marketing term "adult." 
Because obscenity enforcement has never been consistent 
enough to force the pornography syndicates out of business or 
back underground, video dealers are misled into believing, or at 
least acting as if they believe, that the hard-core "adult" busi-
ness is legal. The Attorney General's Commission on Pornogra-
phy in 1986 criticized both federal and local prosecutors for let-
ting the problem get out of control and urged local and federal 
enforcement as the legal solution to the problem of hard-core 
pornography.19 If United States Attorneys and state and local 
prosecutors bring strong cases under present laws, the entire 
hard-core "adult" industry will be shown to be regularly engaged 
in illegal traffic in obscenity. 
The Supreme Court consistently and forcefully has repeated 
that the "crass commercial exploitation of sex"20 is a matter of 
grave concern and a legitimate target of state and federal crimi-
nal and civil laws and treaties.21 In Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Sla-
ton, 22 the Court set out its rebuttal to the industry's argument 
18. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973). 
19. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 366-75. 
20. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973). 
21. Miller, 413 U.S. at 18-19. 
22. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
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that sexually explicit material should not be regulated for con-
senting adults without empirical proof of conclusive harm. The 
Court pointed out that "the primary requirements of decency 
may be enforced against obscene publications"23 and that there 
is "at least an arguable correlation between obscene material 
and crime."24 The Court ruled that "legitimate state interests" 
were at stake in slowing the tide of commercialized obscenity: 
"Rights and interests 'other than those of the advocates are in-
volved.' These include the interest of the public in the quality of 
life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce 
in the great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself."211 
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL STANDARD FOR OBSCENITY 
The relative uniformity of federal and state obscenity statutes 
provides an advantage to law enforcement officials. In Miller, 
the Court formulated a test designed to provide "concrete guide-
lines to isolate 'hard-core' pornography from expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment" in an "attempt to provide posi-
tive guidance to federal and state courts alike."26 Miller held 
that material is obscene and unprotected by the first amend-
ment if all three of the following conditions are met: 
a) ... "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards," would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; b) ... the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently o:ff ensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; 
and c) ... the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.27 
In Miller, the Court revised the old "Roth-Memoirs" test,28 
removing the obligation of prosecutors "to prove a negative, i.e., 
23. Id. at 57 (quoting Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440 (1957)). 
24. Id. at 58. 
25. Id. (citation omitted). 
26. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973). 
27. Id. at 24 (citations omitted). 
28. In 1957, the Court first set forth the test for obscenity as "whether to the average 
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the mate-
rial taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
489 (1957). In 1966, the Court added to the Roth test and extended the greatest protec-
tion ever to sexually explicit material by forcing the prosecution to prove that material is 
"utterly without redeeming social value." A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a 
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that the material was 'utterly without redeeming social 
value' -a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our 
criminal standards of proof. "29 The majority of the Court in 
Miller reached agreement on a test for obscenity for the first 
time since 1957, and in departing from Memoirs, the Court 
reembraced Roth. 30 
On the same day the Supreme Court decided Miller, the 
Court held that the Miller test would be applied to federal, as 
well as state, legislation.31 One year later, in Hamling v. United 
States, the Court upheld and construed the federal mailing stat-
ute "to be limited to material such as that described in 
Miller. "32 In 1978, the Court noted that its construction of the 
mailing statute in Hamling was a "holding that the statute's 
coverage is limited to obscenity,"83 even though the broadcast 
statute at issue in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation was not limited 
to the "obscene" and retained a separate prohibition against 
"indecency" (the second prong of the Miller test).34 The Court 
has made clear in other cases that Miller's guidelines apply to 
all federal laws except broadcast and telephone indecency. 311 
The response of the states was far more tortured. Because fed-
eral courts cannot authoritatively construe state legislation,36 the 
Supreme Court in Miller explicitly invited state courts .to inter-
pret and save existing pre-Miller laws by engrafting the Miller 
test onto the statutes, rather than striking down the statutes 
and requiring the enactment of the Miller test by legislation. 37 
Following Miller, the states either construed their statutes to 
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (emphasis in 
original). 
29. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22; see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 116 (1974). 
30. Miller, 413 U.S. at 29, 36; Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413; see Roth, 354 U.S. 476; see also 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192-94 (1977). 
31. United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129-30 
(1973). 
32. 418 U.S. 87, 115 (1974). 
33. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978). 
34. Id., at 740-41, 743. 
35. See Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293 (1978); Smith v. United States, 431 
U.S. 291 (1977); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); United States v. Orito, 413 
U.S. 139 (1973). 
36. United States v. Thirty-seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) ("We 
lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation."); United States v. 12 200-
Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973). 
37. "If a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or con-
strued, the First Amendment values applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to con-
duct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary." Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). 
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adopt all or most of Miller or declared them invalid and left 
revision to the legislatures.as The process has been continuing 
since 1973, but at present all state obscenity laws have the 
Miller test in effect. 89 
In Miller, the Supreme Court announced for the first time a 
definitive test for determining obscenity and gave "a few plain 
examples" of the type of hard-core sexual conduct that can be 
found patently offensive under state and federal law.40 This test 
has not changed. The only significant further explanation of the 
test is found in Smith v. United States.•• In that case, the Court 
clarified that patent offensiveness and prurient appeal were 
questions of fact to be determined by the hypothetical average 
person applying contemporary community standards.43 Pope v. 
Illinois48 verified what was implicit after Smith-that the third 
prong of the Miller test (whether the material has serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value) is to be judged accord-
ing to the reasonable person standard, rather than by contempo-
rary community standards.•• 
Although the test for obscenity has not changed, a number of 
United States Supreme Court and lower court cases have fleshed 
out the meaning of various words and phrases used by the 
Miller Court. A detailed discussion of the terms used in the 
Miller test is necessary to an understanding of the current legal 
standard for obscenity. Readers should be mindful, however, 
that definitions and jury instructions vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction. The following definitions are adapted from and sup-
ported by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 
38. See Taylor, Pornography and the First Amendment, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE RE-
FORM 156-57 (1983). 
39. Only Vermont and Alaska have no adult obscenity statutes of any kind. Maine, 
New Mexico, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Montana allow local obscenity ordi-
nances. See, e.g., City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 30-38-2 (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-24-27 (10) (1988); W. VA. CODE 
§ 7-1-4(4) (1984); MoNT. CODE ANN.§ 45-8-201 (1985). Obscenity statutes in Oregon and 
Hawaii were struck down on state constitutional grounds. In State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 
732 P.2d 9 (1987), the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that obscenity is protected speech 
under the Oregon Constitution. In State v. Kam, 748 P.2d 372 (1988), the Hawaii Su-
preme Court held Hawaii's obscenity laws violative of the right to privacy created by the 
state constitution. 
40. Miller, 413 U.S. at 25. 
41. 431 U.S. 291 (1977). 
42. Id. at 301-02, 309. 
43. 107 S.Ct. 1918 (1987). 
44. Id. at 1919. 
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A. The Average Person 
Smith made clear that prurient appeal and patent offensive-
ness were to be judged by the average person applying "contem-
porary community standards."'11 In Pinkus v. United States, the 
Court explained that the jury's duty was to "determine the col-
lective view of the community, as best as it can be done. "46 The 
Court also held that it was the adult community that was to be 
considered." Many cases have held that obscenity is not to be 
determined only by its effect on a "sensitive," "insensitive," 
"prudish," or "tolerant" person but also by its effect on the "av-
erage" person who represents the synthesis of the entire adult 
community. 48 
B. Contemporary Community Standards 
In an obscenity trial, the United States Supreme Court re-
quires the fact-finder to determine whether the average person 
would consider certain material prurient and patently offensive, 
using contemporary community standards as the measuring 
stick. As stated in Smith, "community standards simply provide 
the measure against which the jury decides the questions of ap-
peal to prurient interest and patent offensiveness. "49 A juror is 
allowed to draw on personal knowledge of the views of the aver-
age person in the juror's own community, "just as he is entitled 
to draw on his knowledge of the propensities of a 'reasonable' 
person in other areas of the law."l!O 
That the geographical area comprising the community need 
not be national, or even statewide, is evident. The pref erred area 
is that from which the jury is drawn, in order to allow jurors as 
much freedom from confusion as possible. Miller sought to mini-
mize the jury's need to deal with an abstract formulation, by 
allowing less than a national standard.111 As explained in Ham-
ling: "Our holding in Miller that California could constitution-
45. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 293, 302 (1978). 
46. 436 U.S. 293, 301 (1978). 
47. Id. at 298-300. 
48. See id. at 303 (1977); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30, 33 (1973); Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1957); see also F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 
69-77 (1976). 
49. 431 U.S. at 302. 
50. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05 (1974). 
51. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30-32. 
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ally proscribe obscenity in terms of a 'statewide' standard did 
not mean that any such precise geographic area is required as a 
matter of constitutional law."H 
In Jenkins v. Georgia,r.a the Court approved a charge that did 
not specify any geographical size for the community, noting that 
"the States have considerable latitude in framing statutes under 
this element of the Miller decision. "114 The Court held that stat-
utes that define "community" as a precise geographic area are 
just as valid as those that define "community" as statewide and 
those that do not define community at all.1111 In Hamling, how-
ever, the Court suggested that the best approach is to use the 
area the jury is drawn from as the geographical "community."G6 
The Court also held that using the local vicinage as the relevant 
community would not preclude the jury from receiving relevant 
evidence on standards statewide or in other parts of the coun-
try.G7 Pinkus provided that children are not to be considered 
part of the "community" when applying contemporary stan-
dards and that "the community includes all adults who consti-
tute it, and a jury can consider them all in determining relevant 
community standards."H 
C. Expert Testimony 
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton/9 the Court held that once 
the allegedly obscene material is placed in evidence, the jury can 
decide all facets of the test based on its own knowledge, without 
the need for expert testimony. The Court ruled it was not error 
"to fail to require 'expert' affirmative evidence that the materi-
als were obscene when the materials themselves were actually 
placed in evidence. The films, obviously, are the best evidence of 
what they represent."60 The Court in Kaplan v. California61 
stated that there was no "constitutional need for 'expert' testi-
mony on beha!f of the prosecution, or for any other ancillary evi-
52. 418 U.S. at 105. 
53. 418 U.S. 153 (1974). 
54. Id. at 157. 
55. Id. 
56. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1974). 
57. Id. at 105-06. 
58. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 298, 300 (1978). 
59. 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
60. Id. at 56 (citations omitted). 
61. 413 U.S. 115 (1973). 
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dence of obscenity, once the allegedly obscene material itself is 
placed in evidence. "82 
Limitations on the admissibility of evidence lie in the broad 
discretion of the trial court. In Hamling v. United States,63 the 
Court upheld rulings excluding comparables (similar sexually ex-
plicit material available nearby), expert witnesses, and other 
evidence. 
D. Appeal to Prurient Interest 
The Model Penal Code definition approved by the Court in 
Roth v. United States defines "prurient interest" in part as a 
"shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion."" The 
Court ref erred to obscene material as that "which deals with sex 
in a manner appealing to prurient interest, "85 meaning "material 
having tendency to excite lustful thoughts. 1188 The Court also 
saw "no significant difference between the meaning of obscenity 
developed in the case law and the definition of the A.L.I. Model 
Penal Code."87 In Mishkin,68 Hamling,69 and Pinkus,70 the Court 
made clear that when material is intended to stimulate a specific 
deviant group or a specific deviant sexual interest, the prurient 
interest test is satisfied if jurors find that the material appeals to 
the prurient interest of the intended and probable deviant 
group. 
In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n,71 the Court 
made a general observation about the appeal of pornography to 
normal persons, which was cited with approval in footnote 
twenty of Roth:12 "They take 'their attraction from the general 
interest, eager and wholesome it may be, in their subjects, but a 
prurient interest may be excited and appealed to. '173 In a later 
62. Id. at 121. 
63. 418 U.S. 87, 124-27 (1974). 
64. 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (quoting Model Penal Code § 207.10(2) (Tentative 
Draft No. 6 1957)). 
65. Id. at 487. 
66. Id. at 487 n.20. 
67. Id. 
68. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966). 
69. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 127-30 (1974). 
70. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 301-03 (1978). 
71. 236 U.S. 230 (1915). 
72. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957). 
73. Mutual Film, 236 U.S. at 242. 
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case, the Court characterized this trait as "the widespread weak-
ness for titillation by pornography."" 
The Supreme Court has used various descriptive words to de-
fine "prurient." Material can be prurient when it either attracts 
or repulses.711 Material that may be attractive or erotic, even to 
the average person, has been held to be obscene.76 Bizarre mate-
rial, repulsive to the average person, also has been found ob-
scene. 77 Prurient appeal is properly a synthesis of all the consid-
erations that describe an interest in sex for its own sake or for 
commercial gain. 78 
The Court has chosen its wording carefully to avoid the 
problems of the old "Hicklin Rule,"79 which judged obscenity 
solely by its impact on the young or sensitive. In Miller, the 
Court stated that the guideline is "whether 'the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards' would find that 
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest."80 
In Roth, the Court asked "whether to the averag~ person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of 
the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."81 In 
Miller, the Court also said that "triers of fact are asked to de-
cide whether 'the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards' would consider certain materials 
'prurient.' "82 
The Court in Miller did not say that the fact-finder was to 
decide whether the matter appealed only to the shameful or 
morbid interest of an average person applying contemporary 
74. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 471 (1966). 
75. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-(1966); see also Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (quot-
ing Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 CoLUM. L. REV. 669, 677 
(1963)). 
76. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1984); Ginzburg, 383 U.S. 463; see also 
Penthouse Int'l v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Obscene 
Printed Matter, 668 F. Supp. 50 (D. Mass. 1987); Penthouse Int'l v. Webb, 594 F. Supp. 
1186 (N.D. Ga. 1984); United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 536 F. 
Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); State v. Triplett, 722 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Flynt v. 
State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); City of 
Belleville v. Morgan, 60 Ill. App. 3d 434, 376 N.E.2d 704 (1978). 
77. Ward v. lllinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977); Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 502, 505; United States 
v. Guglielmi, 819 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1987). 
78. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 48, at 96-102; MODEL PENAL CODE§ 251.4 commenta-
ries at 488-94 (Official Code and Revised Comments 1980). 
79. The "Hicklin Rule" is derived from the English case of Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-
Q.B. 360 (1868), in which the test for obscenity was "whether the tendency of the matter 
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such im-
moral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." 
80. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (emphasis added). 
81. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (emphasis added). 
82. 413 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added). 
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community standards. Rather, it required the fact-finder to de-
termine whether the average person, applying those standards, 
would find the appeal directed to the prurient interest. This 
subtle distinction is important. If a judge charges a jury that it 
must find the material obscene only if the material appeals to or 
excites a shameful or morbid interest in an average person or in 
the jury, confusion can result, and the purpose of obscenity 
law-to distinguish illegal from protected material-would be 
thwarted.88 
E. Serious Value and Pandering 
Pope v. Illinois verified that the third prong of the Miller test 
is to be judged by the reasonable person standard, rather than 
by contemporary community standards, and held that the issue 
of whether the material has serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value is not limited to the individual community, but is 
based on an objective standard.84 The judge and jury can still 
use their own "knowledge of the propensities of a 'reasonable' 
person" to determine objective value without reference to the 
community, and without the need for expert testimony, as they 
do to determine prurience and offensiveness within the reference 
of community standards. 811 
Whether the material is promoted or "pandered" as sexually 
explicit material is relevant to the determination of whether the 
material has serious value. The Court referred to this as "the 
sordid business of pandering-'the business of purveying textual 
or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic inter-
est of their customers.' "88 The Court has ruled that "evidence of 
pandering to prurient interests in the creation, promotion, or 
dissemination of material is relevant in determining whether the 
material is obscene.''87 Evidence of pandering can be used to re-
but allegations that the material has serious value.88 
83. United States v. Guglielmi, 819 F.2d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 1987); Fahringer, The 
Defense of an Obscenity ·Prosecution, TRIAL, May 1978, at 32. 
84. 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987). 
85. See also Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977); F. SCHAUER, supra note 
48, at 123-24. 
86. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1966) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 
495-96 (Warren, C.J., concurring)). 
87. Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 598 (1977). 
88. Id.; see also Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 303-04 (1978); Hamling v. 
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 130 (1974). 
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F. Patently Offensive Sexual Conduct 
In Miller, the Court offered examples of the type of "sexual 
conduct" that needed to be defined by state statute, making 
clear that states were not limited to those examples. 89 The Court 
stated that it was not limiting the states but only offering exam-
ples. In Ward v. Illinois,90 the Court approved the inclusion of 
bestiality and sadomasochism as examples of sexual conduct in a 
state statute. The Court held that notice was provided by the 
descriptions of flagellation, homosexuality, oral contact, and in-
tercourse included in Illinois law by the Illinois Supreme 
Court.91 
The concept of patent offensiveness can be found in the defi-
nition of obscene in the Model Penal Code as "substantially be-
yond customary limits of candor in describing or representing 
such matters,"92 a definition based on Judge Learned Hand's 
definition of "obscene" in United States v. Kennerly.93 This lan-
guage later reappeared in Justice Brennan's opinion in Jacobel-
lis v. Ohio,94 which also approved of Justice Harlan's statement 
that, to be "patently offensive" or "indecent," materials should 
be "so offensive on their face as to affront current community 
standards of decency."911 Justice Brennan referred to this as "a 
deviation from society's standards of decency."96 
Whether material is "patently offensive" to contemporary 
community standards should be determined by what is "ac-
cepted" in that community, not what is merely "tolerated." In 
Smith v. United States, the Court affirmed a conviction and ap-
proved the jury instruction "that contemporary community 
standards were set by what is in fact accepted in the community 
as a whole."97 In Miller, the Court stated that "[i]t is neither 
realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment 
as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept pub-
lic depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New 
York City."98 
89. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). 
90. 431 U.S. 767, 773 (1977). 
91. Id. at 771-73. 
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 commentaries at 492 (Official Code and Revised 
Comments 1980); see also F. SCHAUER, supra note 48, at 102-05. 
93. 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). 
94. 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). 
95. Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962). 
96. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 192. 
97. 431 U.S. 291, 297-98 (1977) (emphasis added). 
98. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973) (emphasis added). 
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The Court has employed this concept of community accept-
ance in its decisions on patent offensiveness since Roth. 99 Most 
recently, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court held that the 
normal definition of "indecent" referred to "nonconformance 
with accepted standards of morality."1°0 The Court also noted 
that Justice Harlan used "indecency" as a shorthand term for 
"patent offensiveness" and that the FCC similarly defined "in-
decent" in the case before it. 101 
In Sedelbauer v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court approved 
the use of the word "acceptance" in the application of commu-
nity standards to patent offensiveness, ruling that "the trial 
court did not err in using the word 'accept' in giving instructions 
to the jury rather than the word 'tolerate' as requested by the 
defendant. "102 Courts also have disallowed or restricted the use 
of "comparables" as evidence that community standards of pat-
ent offensiveness have not been violated, unless a proper foun-
dation showing similarity and acceptance is met.103 The Court, 
in Hamling, followed the Second Circuit's decision that "[m]ere 
availability of similar material by itself means nothing more 
than that other persons are engaged in similar activities."10• 
III. THE NEED FOR A PER SE HARD-CORE PORNOGRAPHY RULE 
Several factors contribute to the inconsistency surrounding 
the enforcement of obscenity laws in state and local jurisdic-
tions. This inconsistency could be remedied by the adoption of a 
per se rule mandating that all commercial hard-core pornogra-
phy be recognized as illegal. 
First, state court interpretations of their obscenity laws will 
generally be upheld by the United States Supreme Court, which 
99. See Smith, 431 U.S. 291; Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); 
Miller, 413 U.S. 15; A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" 
v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
100. 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978). 
101. Id. at 740 n.15. 
102. Sedelbauer v. State, 428 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Ind. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 
(1982). 
103. See United States v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237, 245 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1046 (1981); United States v. Womack, 509 F.2d 368, 375-81 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 422 U.S. 1022 (1975); Womack v. United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 365 U.S. 859 (1961); Flynt v. State, 154 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, 673-78, 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Long v. 130 Market Street Gift & Novelty, 294 Pa. 
Super. 383, 440 A.2d 517, 521 (1982). 
104. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 126 (quoting United States v. Manarite, 
448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
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considers itself, and all federal courts, "bound" by such interpre-
tations.1011 Federal courts can only declare state laws valid or in-
valid and declare whether any invalid provision or interpretation 
is severable.108 Thus, state courts retain control to construe and 
enforce state laws. 107 
Second, differences in penalty schemes in various jurisdic-
tions, 108 and the availability of several possible causes of action 
(i.e., criminal, civil nuisance, injunction, declaratory judgment, 
racketeering, and organized crime)109 pose further complications. 
These choices create variations in the effectiveness of prosecu-
tions from state to state. 
Despite these two problems, if an obscenity case is tried in 
any of the ninety-four federal districts or within the forty-six 
states with active statutes or ordinances, 110 the same basic 
guidelines are used to determine obscenity. Nevertheless, the is-
sues become substantially confused because jury instructions 
differ dramatically in their explanation of the terms used in the 
Miller test, as can the definitions used by trial judges. State 
courts, as well as federal courts, retain wide latitude in defining 
legal terms and drafting jury instructions. This effectively 
changes application of the law from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
105. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 772-73 (1977); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 
502, 507-08, 510-11 (1966); Kingsley Int'l Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688 (1959); 
see also Guaranty Trust v. Blodgett, 287 U.S. 509, 513 (1933) (accepting state court in-
terpretation of tax law as binding on Supreme Court). 
106. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985); Metromedia, Inc. v. 
San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 521 n.26 (1981); United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photo-
graphs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965); see 
also McCarthy v. Briscoe, 553 F.2d 1005, 1007 (5th Cir. 1977). 
107. See Turoso v. Cleveland Mun. Court, 674 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1982); Sovereign 
News Co. v. Falke, 674 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1982); Sovereign News Co. v. Falke, 448 F. 
Supp. 306 (N.D. Ohio 1977); State v. Burgun, 56 Ohio St. 2d 354, 384 N.E.2d 255 (1978); 
see also Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 339-40, 343-46 (1975); Miller v. California, 418 
U.S. 915 (1974) (Miller II); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (Miller I); Hoover v. 
Byrd, 801 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1986); Red Bluff Drive-Inv. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 
1981); People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 522 N.E.2d 1200 (1988); Andrews v. State, 652 
S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); People v. Enskat, 33 Cal. App. 3d 900, 109 Cal. Rptr. 
433 (1973). 
108. E.g., Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1337-40 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding Ari-
zona's felony fine provision for up to $1 million); 511 Detroit Street, Inc. v. Kelley, 807 
F.2d 1293, 1298-99 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding Michigan's felony fine provision for up to 
$5 million). 
109. E.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982) (criminal RICO); 
State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 366 S.E.2d 459 (1988) (criminal); 4447 Corp. v. Gold-
smith, 504 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. 1987) (Indiana RICO); State ex rel. Kidwell v. U.S. Market-
ing, Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981), app. dismissed, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982) (civil 
nuisance); People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater, 101 Cal. App. 3d 
296, 161 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1980) (civil injunction). 
110. See supra note 39. 
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and proves a hindrance to law enforcement. The Miller test is 
fairly simple to state and debate. However, after the judge adds 
several pages of explanations as to what "average person," "con-
temporary community standards," "prurient," "patently offen-
sive," and "serious value" mean, the prosecutor's argument and 
the trier of fact's decision become much more difficult. 
This morass of conflicting definitions can discourage prosecu-
tors from bringing obscenity cases to trial and can confuse ju-
rors, causing deadlocked and hung juries, and acquittals on ma-
terial that is clearly obscene. m The United States Supreme 
Court should end this confusion by ruling on a comprehensive 
series of issues to clarify how the test should be applied and how 
the terms in Miller should be read. 
Congress and the states could help the public and the courts 
by passing supplementary statutes that prohibit illegal material 
in an objective, per se manner.112 Such an approach would pro-
vide at least one major degree of uniformity to complement the 
application of the obscenity test. A simple prohibition of hard-
core pornography would provide a benchmark by which to slow 
commercial trafficking in human flesh-at least by removing 
filmed acts of prostitution. Filmed or photographed acts of ac-
tual sexual intercourse would be prohibited, but simulations or 
suggestions of sex would not be outlawed by the per se rule. The 
existing Miller laws could be used, along with the pandering 
rule, 113 to prosecute or enjoin simulated depictions of sex that 
are still considered obscene because of their prurient appeal, of-
fensiveness, and lack of serious value. Where films or photos vis-
ibly display penetration, however, their commercial distribution 
would be forbidden. 
The Attorney General's Commission resisted recommending a 
per se approach, favoring instead the full enforcement of ex-
isting, tested laws. 114 The Commission was correct in holding 
that Miller is enforceable, but the Commission's frustration with 
lack of enforcement is the very problem addressed by a more 
limited rule than Miller for films or photographs of actual sex 
acts that are nothing more than filmed or photographed acts of 
prostitution. This per se proposal would not conflict with Miller 
111. J CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 460; Project, supra note 10, at 895-
96, 910-28. 
112. This writer first proposed a per se definition of obscenity in 1983. Taylor, supra 
note 38. See also Milligan, Obscenity: Malum in Se or Only in Context? The Supreme 
Court's Long Ordeal, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 631, 643-45 (1978). 
113. Taylor, supra note 38, at 159. 
114. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 364-66. 
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because the proposal would reach less material than the Miller 
test, but it would make prosecution easier for the material 
Miller always reaches-the hardest of hard-core pornography: 
actual intercourse or ejaculation occurring in front of a camera 
for commercial exploitation. 
IV. THE HARD-CORE PORNOGRAPHY RULE 
The proposed new statute or ordinance should be simple and 
could read: 
No person with knowledge of the character of the ma-
terial shall knowingly distribute or exhibit, to the public 
or for commercial purposes, any hard-core pornography. 
Hard-core pornography means any material or per-
formance that explicitly depicts ultimate sexual acts, in-
cluding vaginal or anal intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, 
analingus, and masturbation, where penetration, manipu-
lation, or ejaculation of the genitals is clearly visible. 
Congress and state legislatures should make the statute appli-
cable to importation, interstate shipment, mailing, public dis-
semination, and commercial distribution. The law should also 
provide an affirmative defense for bona fide scientific, educa-
tional, or research purposes, and/or provide an exception for se-
rious literary, artistic, political, or scientific uses. Under such a 
scheme, only the commercial pandering of explicit sex would be 
prohibited. 
As used by the Supreme Court and lower courts since 1957, 
the phrase "hard-core pornography" has become as much a legal 
term of art as the word "obscene."1u Unlike obscenity, however, 
the definition of hard-core pornography has not changed over 
the years. It has always ref erred to visual materials that show 
explicit sexual acts. The trade term for hard-core pornography is 
PCV-"penetration clearly visible." The Supreme Court has his-
torically struggled with developing a test for obscenity, but the 
majority has always seemed to agree on the illegality of "hard-
core pornography."116 The Miller test, like the Roth test, allows 
115. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 118 (1974). "[T]he word 'obscene' 
... is not merely a generic or descriptive term, but a legal term of art." Id. 
116. In announcing the obscenity test, Chief Justice Burger wrote: "Under the hold-
ings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of 
obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive 'hard core' 
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material to he found obscene even if it is not hard-core pornog-
raphy, because the sex may he "simulated." 
In Roth, the materials arguably were not hard-core pornogra-
phy117 because they were not explicit. Justice Harlan, in his con-
currence in the companion state case to Roth, Alberts v. Califor-
nia, argued that the state conviction should be upheld because 
states should have more freedom to regulate pornographic 
materials. 118 But Harlan thought Roth's federal case should be 
dismissed, because the federal government should only be al-
lowed to criminalize "hard-core pornography."119 Justice Harlan 
repeated this contention in 1962 when he argued that the federal 
government should not be allowed to prohibit mailings of mere 
nudity, which were not "hard-core."120 
In 1966, a majority of the Court recognized that hard-core ma-
terial is clearly obscene, but that the Roth test also reaches ma-
terial that is not as explicit as hard-core pornography. In 
Mishkin v. New York, the Court noted that New York's decision 
to criminalize only hard-core pornography meant that its "defi-
nition of obscenity is more stringent than the Roth definition," 
reaching "a narrower class of conduct," and therefore, "the judg-
ment that the constitutional criteria are satisfied is implicit in 
the application of [New York's law].m21 
In Miller, the Court made clear that more than just hard-core 
pornography could he outlawed, giving examples of material that 
states could constitutionally prohibit, including "simulated" de-
scriptions of sex acts and "lewd exhibition of the genitals,"122 
neither of which constitutes hard-core pornography. Had the 
Court followed Justice Harlan's view, it would have limited the 
Miller test to actual depictions of ultimate sex acts. Such a limi-
tation on law enforcement would have provided the federal gov-
ernment and states with little protection against the increasingly 
explicit and deviant material turned out by the pornography in-
dustry. Much hard-core and obscene medium-core (simulated) 
materials would have gone unprosecuted. Such a hard-core limi-
tation would have departed from Roth and from the previously 
discussed "pandering" concept, where materials that were not 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed." 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973). 
117. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
118. 354 U.S. 476, 501-02 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
119. 354 U.S. 476, 507 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
120. Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 489 (1962). 
121. 383 U.S. 506, 508 (1966). 
122. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). 
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hard-core (and, the Court notes, may not have been "obscene" 
standing alone) were held subject to conviction if the 
pornographer pandered them as if they were obscene and highly 
prurient.123 The proposed hard-core rule would, therefore, be a 
supplement to existing obscenity laws, not a replacement. 
There is a difference between hard-core sexual conduct, as 
used in Miller, and hard-core pornography. Hard-core conduct 
refers to types of sex-ultimate sexual acts and lewd exhibitions 
of the genitals-not to a type of material. Hard-core pornogra-
phy refers to a way of depicting ultimate sexual acts, by explic-
itly depicting genital penetration or ejaculation. Hard-core con-
duct-the Miller examples-can be depicted in a hard-core way 
(PCV), a medium-core way (simulated), or even a soft-core way 
(posing of nudes with focus on genitals). These three kinds of 
pornography can all be found obscene under Miller, 12• but only 
if presented in a patently offensive way that appeals to the pru-
rient interest and has no serious value.1n The proposed hard-
core rule would apply only to hard-core conduct depicted in a 
hard-core way-by penetration clearly visible. 
The term "hard-core pornography," as used by the courts, in-
cludes actual and simulated sex and can even include written 
descriptions of ultimate sex acts. By limiting the proposed per se 
rule to that portion of hard-core pornography where penetration 
is clearly visible, the vagueness of the Miller test is avoided 
while the objectivity and constitutionality of this per se proposal 
is strengthened. The other types of hard-core pornography that 
depict simulated sex or describe graphic sex would be left to cur-
rent obscenity laws under Miller, in order to allow for the appli-
cation of the serious value and community standards tests. 
Many researchers and much of the public agree that pornogra-
phy involving children, violence (whether hard- or soft-core), 
and other degrading or bizarre acts is harmful and causes or 
contributes to antisocial and criminal behavior.126 The United 
123. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
124. See e.g., United States v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1046 (1981) (holding obscene the hard-core film Deep Throat); Penthouse Int'l v. McAu-
liffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that lewd exhihition of the genitals in maga-
zine pictorial met patent offensiveness test, and that Penthouse and Oui magazines were 
therefore obscene); United States v. West Coast News, 357 F.2d 855, 857 (6th Cir. 1966) 
(holding book titled Sex Life of a Cop "by any standard" to be obscene-"a writing so 
bad that no amount of sophisticated dialectics could absolve it from classification as 
'hard-core'"); State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Vixen," 35 Ohio 
St. 2d 251, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973) (holding obscene a film with simulated sex scenes). 
125. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25. 
126. See generally CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3. 
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States Supreme Court, however, has never required obscenity 
laws to be based on or limited by current research or the opin-
ions of professors and doctors who may agree or disagree with 
present law.127 The Court has been steadfast in allowing Con-
gress and state legislatures to define the crime of obscenity, 
within the guidelines of the Miller test. 128 
Obviously, simulated and normal sexual acts and lewd exhibi-
tion of the genitals (even without conduct) are not hard-core 
pornography in the strict sense, even though they are types of 
hard-core sexual activities (as opposed to mere nudity and fon-
dling). Yet these can be found obscene under the Miller test. It 
is implicit that if such hard-core types of sex are depicted in a 
hard-core fashion, then the material is clearly illegal and can be 
subject to criminal and civil penalties under federal and state 
statutes. 
Under the Miller test, for example, the Fifth Circuit found 
issues of Penthouse and Oui magazines, but not Playboy, to be 
obscene.129 Under Ohio law, the simulated sex movie "Vixen" 
was enjoined as obscene under the more restricted pre-Miller 
standard of Roth, then reaffirmed as obscene by the Ohio Su-
preme Court after the Miller standards were announced.180 The 
court held that scenes of "purported acts of sexual intercourse" 
exhibited for "commercial exploitation" were obscene and un-
protected by the Constitution. 181 
It is not open to debate that all explicit sexual material can be 
found obscene, and that nonexplicit, simulated material also can 
violate the Miller standards. That much the Supreme Court has 
made clear. Whether the theme or context of the sex is violent, 
consensual, degrading, or bizarre is an element only of how "pa-
tently offensive" the depiction is. For a finding of obscenity, the 
Court in Miller did not require patently offensive sexual acts, 
but rather sexual acts depicted in a patently offensive way. 
Miller requires an average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, to find that the work depicts or describes sex-
ual conduct (such as ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, 
actual or simulated; masturbation; excretory functions; or lewd 
exhibition of the genitals) in a patently offensive way.182 As 
127. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-64 (1973). 
128. Id. at 64-69. 
129. Penthouse Int'! v. McAulitfe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980). 
130. State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Vixen," 35 Ohio St. 2d 
215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973). 
131. Id. at 880, 882. 
132. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). 
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made clear in Mishkin and in the cases sustained on appeal 
since Miller, these materials can include the violent133 as well as 
non-violent,134 the simulated,136 and the so-called "soft-core" or 
"medium-core. " 136 
Admittedly, this proposal for a per se hard-core statute would 
not reach to all the obscenity now prosecutable under present 
Miller laws. This proposal would, however, include the material 
that most of the individual Supreme Court Justices have agreed 
is illegal. Even Justice Stewart, concurring in Memoirs as he had 
dissented in Ginzburg, stated his view that "only hard-core por-
nography may be suppressed.>1137 In Roth, the Court stated that 
obscenity can be prosecuted without harming the first amend-
ment's protection "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people."138 But the Court added in Miller that "the public por-
trayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the 
ensuing commercial gain, is a different matter."139 This Article's 
hard-core proposal would take advantage of the clearest consen-
sus in the field of obscenity law, and its implementation would 
eliminate most obviously illegal material. 
Because state and federal law can reach materials that are not 
hard-core pornography, the courts have assumed that if the 
materials are indeed hard-core, their obscenity is clear as a mat-
ter of law. An underlying reason for courts to treat hard-core 
pornography as obscene per se is that its commercial production 
necessarily involves prostitution. 14° Convictions have been ob-
tained and nuisance actions sustained where producers of hard-
core pornography were apprehended in California and New York 
and charged with prostitution-related offenses. 141 
133. See, e.g., State v. Riggins, 645 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. XNLT 
Corp., 536 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
134. United States v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1981); see also 2 CoMM'N ON 
PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 1745-80 (listing films held obscene). 
135. State ex rel. Keating v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Vixen," 35 Ohio St. 2d 
215, 301 N.E.2d 880 (1973). 
136. Penthouse Int'l v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1980). 
137. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. at 193 (1977) (citing A Book Named "John 
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 421 
(1966)). 
138. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 476, 484 (1957). 
139. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 35 (1973) (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 496 (Warren, 
C.J., concurring)). 
140. State ex rel. Sensenbrenner v. Adult Book Store, 26 Ohio App. 2d 183, 213, 271 
N.E.2d 13, 31 (1971), atf'd, 35 Ohio St. 2d 220, 301 N.E.2d 695 (1973), cert. denied, 421 
U.S. 934 (1975). 
141. See People ex rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enters., 124 Cal. App. 3d 
1023, 177 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1981), vacated on other grounds, 33 Cal. 3d 328, 188 Cal. Rptr. 
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In one obscenity case, an Ohio appellate court noted, "It is 
highly improbable that some of the material herein involved 
could be prepared without acts of prostitution or sodomy."H2 
The court recognized that "[i]nherent in the publication of pic-
torial pornography is the commission of acts . . . which are ab-
horrent to our national society, and are prohibited by the laws of 
almost all jurisdictions. mo 
The Court in Mishkin inferred that if a state limits its obscen-
ity laws to hard-core pornography, then a finding of illegality 
under that rule automatically satisfies the "constitutional crite-
ria" of the obscenity test. H• Like New York, the California Su-
preme Court limited the reach of its penal statute, holding that 
"it is clear that Section 311 prohibits only 'hard-core pornogra-
phy' ... and that '[t]o constitute obscenity ... the material 
must contain a graphic description of sexual activity.' "146 
In 1968, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin discussed the "hard-
core" versus Roth test in State v. Voshart, where it noted that 
state laws must "stay within the bounds of the constitutional 
criteria" and that there "appear to be two such definitions that 
have been given United States Supreme Court approval.''148 The 
court said that one "is the Roth test . . . capsulized in the 
Memoirs case."147 The court then added: "The alternative defi-
nition defines 'obscene' as meaning 'hard core pornography' ... 
this definition . . . was held to meet the constitutional criteria" 
in Mishkin v. New York. m The court held the materials "ob-
scene under either the Roth test or hard core pornography test," 
but recognized the "hard-core rule" as "most clearly indicating 
what may be considered obscene ... and that leaves the small-
est room for disagreement," quoting Justice Harlan's dissent in 
740, 656 P.2d 1170 (1983); People v. Souter, 125 Cal. App. 3d 563, 178 Cal. Rptr. 111 
(1981); People v. Kovner, 96 Misc. 2d 414, 409 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1978); Peo-
ple ex rel. Van De Kamp v. American Art Enters., 75 Cal. App. 3d 523, 142 Cal. Rptr. 
338 (1977); People v. Fixler, 56 Cal. App. 3d 321, 128 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1976). But see 
People v. Freeman, No. 000070 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed Aug. 25, 1988) (Westlaw, CA-CS file) 
(finding that hard-core film production is pandering only when the state proves the per-
formers acted for the purpose of "sexual arousal or gratification," and the film is legally 
obscene). 
142. Sensenbrenner, 26 Ohio App. 2d at 213, 271 N.E.2d at 31. 
143. Id. 
144. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966). 
145. Bloom v. Municipal Court, 16 Cal. 3d 71, 79, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317, 322, 545 P.2d 
229, 234 (1976) (citations omitted). 
146. State v. Voshart, 39 Wis. 2d 419, 429, 159 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1968). 
147. Id. at 429, 159 N.W.2d at 6. 
148. Id. at 430, 159 N.W.2d at 7. 
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Memoirs that court and others will "know . . when [they] see 
it."149 
The "hard-core rule" has been used often by courts as a short-
cut for finding obscenity, as an Ohio trial court did in enjoining 
the movie Deep Throat by finding that "this is hard core por-
nography and as such it can and does speak for itself. The Court 
holds as a matter of law that this film is hard core pornography 
and obscene .... m 11o 
In 1971, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland asserted 
that "in some instances the more traditional methods of proof 
by expert testimony may be dispensed with, where the ques-
tioned material is such 'hard-core pornography' that it 'screams 
for all to hear' as to its pornographic content."1111 In 1987, the 
same court reviewed the application of this "shortcut" in a case 
where the trial judge did not apply the Miller test but instead 
found the material "hard-core."1112 The appeals court held the 
materials not obscene and not "hard-core, black market, under 
the counter type," as the trial court had found, when compared 
to the explicit and deviant materials found to be "hard-core" in 
earlier cases.1118 Although the material before the court did not 
qualify as "hard-core," and did not meet the Miller test either, 
the court said, "[I]t is not clear since Miller was decided by the 
Supreme Court whether the 'evidentiary shortcut' is still viable," 
even though it is still "possible," but warned that "if trial judges 
use the 'evidentiary shortcut' of Woodruff, they should state 
with some particularity the reasons why they have found the 
magazines or books to be obscene."1M 
The proposed per se rule would eliminate any vagueness, by 
covering only the type of hard-core material that depicts (not 
describes) penetration clearly visible. Because this proposal is 
completely objective, if a trial court found material to be hard-
core pornography under the proposal, the appellate courts need 
not differ with that application of the term. 
Under the proposed per se hard-core rule, the pornographers, 
the public, and the juries could apply the objective test to see if 
149. Id. at 430, 159 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of 
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 457 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); see also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
150. Whiting v. Roxy, Ltd., 66 Ohio Op. 2d 369, 371, 293 N.E.2d 889, 891 (C.P. 1973). 
151. Woodruff v. State, 11 Md. App. 202, 226, 273 A.2d 436, 449 (1971) (citation 
omitted). 
152. 5297 Pulaski Highway v. Town of Perryville, 69 Md. App. 590, 519 A.2d 206 
(1987). 
153. Id. at 606, 519 A.2d at 214. 
154. Id. at 604-05, 519 A.2d at 214. 
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the material depicts explicit sex. The trial and appellate courts 
could "conduct an independent review of constitutional claims 
when necessary," as recognized in Miller. uio The Court in Miller 
was concerned that "hard-core" pornography would be exposed 
"without limit" if "the inability to define regulated materials 
with ultimate, godlike precision altogether removes the power of 
the states or the Congress to regulate. 111116 The Miller test allows 
all obscenity to be determined, but the "hard-core" rule allows 
the most obvious obscenity to be determined with ultimate, 
though perhaps not "godlike," precision. 
There is no guarantee that the United States Supreme Court 
would uphold a ban on all commercial exploitation of hard-core 
pornography without proof of its obscenity under the Miller 
test. The Supreme Court, however, did uphold New York's child 
pornography law without requiring proof of obscenity.1117 Some 
state or the Congress must lead the nation in new theories in 
obscenity law and push the Court to approve these changes so 
that others may follow. The Supreme Court already has given its 
approval to many innovative solutions. In a Detroit zoning case 
requiring the dispersal of sexually oriented businesses, Justice 
Stevens wrote that "the city must be allowed a reasonable op-
portunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious 
problems."1118 
New York has a history of leadership and innovation in ob-
scenity laws, and the United States Supreme Court has sup-
ported New York's bold and intelligent moves.1119 Since Ferber, 
eighteen states have enacted statutes criminalizing the mere 
possession of child pornography as per se illegal, and the state 
supreme courts in Ohio, Alabama, and Illinois have sustained 
those laws.160 Sexual devices such as dildos and artificial genitals 
155. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). 
156. Id. at 28. 
157. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
158. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (upholding location 
zoning of "adult" bookstores and theatres because of the "secondary effects" those busi-
nesses had on a downtown area, even though there was no determination that the book-
stores and theatres trafficked in obscenity); see also City of Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
159. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding New York's child por-
nography law); Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973) (upholding New York's use of 
search warrants); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S 629 (1968) (upholding New York's 
"harmful to minors" law); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966) (upholding New 
York's application of "deviant" standards); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 
(1957) (upholding New York's injunction statute). 
160. ALA. ConE § 13 A-12-192 (1982 & Supp. 1987); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13-3553 
(A)(2) (Supp. 1987); CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-6-403 (1986); FLA. STAT ANN. § 827.071 (4)-(5) 
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were classified as obscene devices and made illegal per se in 
Georgia for commercial distribution. The Georgia Supreme 
Court explicitly approved the statute161 and now Texas has up-
held a similar law.162 Treating hard-core pornography in the 
same manner that the law treats child pornography and obscene 
devices would provide a much needed definitive solution to the 
pornography problem in America. 
In a nationwide survey of law enforcement efforts after Miller, 
a New York University Law Review study concluded that 
"[o]bscenity laws have been characterized as having only a mini-
mal effect on the conduct of prosecutors and pornographers. "163 
More than half of the prosecutors surveyed said Miller had no 
effect on convictions, twenty-nine percent said Miller helped the 
prosecution, and seventeen percent said it helped the defense.1" 
One of the responses, from an Ohio prosecutor, was typical in its 
plea: "I would like to see communities given a definition by the 
[Supreme Court] which would enable them to make a specific 
listing of items which would be per se obscene by their legisla-
tive body's interpretation of the prevailing community stan-
dards. "1611 The authors found that the public had become more 
tolerant of pornographic material and concluded that this "liber-
alization of attitudes has in turn influenced prosecutors to han-
dle only cases involving particularly hard core materials."166 
(Harrison Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (b)(8) (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE 
§ 18-1507A (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20.1(2) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3516 (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 617.246 (4) (West 1987); Mo. REv. STAT§ 573.037 
(Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 28.808 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.730 (1987); OHIO 
REV. CoDE ANN. § 2907.321 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1024.1-1024.2 
(West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-23.1 (1988); TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. 
§ 43.26 (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-5a-3 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9.68 A.o70 (1988); see State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 
(1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1581 (1987); Felton v. State, 526 So. 2d 635 (Ala. Crim. 
App. 1986), aff'd, 526 So. 2d 638 (Ala. 1988); People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 522 
N.E.2d 1200 (1988). 
161. Sewell v. State, 238 Ga. 495, 233 S.E.2d 187 (1977); Teal v. State, 143 Ga. App. 
47, 238 S.E.2d 128 (1977) (upholding GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-80 (c) (1984)). Both Sewell 
and Teal were dismissed "for want of substantial federal question" by the Supreme 
Court, 435 U.S. 982 (1978); 435 U.S. 989 (1978). Such a dismissal of an appeal is a deci-
sion on the merits and affirms the state court decision. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 
343-45 (1975). 
162. Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260, 265-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (upholding TEx. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.21 (a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1988)); see also Red Bluff Drive-In v. 
Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1027-28 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 913 (1982) (uphold-
ing the Texas statute). But see People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 
348, 368-70 (Colo. 1985). 
163. Project, supra note 13, at 928. 
164. Id. at 900. 
165. Id. at 896 n.403. 
166. Id. at 898. 
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The Miller standard, as modified by Pope and Smith, 167 could 
control the hard-core industry if vigorously enforced in most ju-
risdictions by federal and state prosecutors, as the Attorney 
General's Commission recommended.168 Its inherent weakness is 
its subjective application in various local communities and the 
undeniable confusion caused by differing interpretations of each 
word of the test. The United States Supreme Court could cure 
much of the problem by approving one proper charge to a jury 
or one simple and correct statement of the test by a court. The 
hard-core rule, on the other hand, would do in objectivity what 
such a ruling by the Court would do in removing subjectivity. If 
the law of obscenity-the so-called "intractable" problem169-is 
to be clarified, these changes should be made soon, before the 
future becomes the past and we are forced to live forever with 
the disgrace of the present. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress and the state legislatures should adopt an objective 
definition of obscenity that would make all hard-core pornogra-
phy per se illegal for commercial distribution. The Supreme 
Court in analyzing the hard-core rule should apply the balancing 
of interests test used to sustain the New York child pornography 
law. In Ferber, the Court held that in rare instances, when "the 
evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive 
interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudi-
cation is required."170 In Pope, Justice Scalia approved an objec-
tive approach to the value prong of Miller and suggested that 
perhaps a "reexamination" of Miller was in order.171 
Evidence of the harmful effects of pornography and law en-
forcement difficulties in this area172 are strong reasons for adop-
tion of a per se rule. Hard-core pornography is most certainly an 
area where "expressive interests," if any, are heavily outweighed 
by the "evil to be restricted."173 
167. Pope v. lliinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 
(1977). 
168. 1 COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 364-72. 
169. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 16 (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 
390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting)). 
170. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982). 
171. Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1923 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
172. See 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 3, at 299-351. 
173. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64. 
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Intellectual freedom in America exists at a higher level than 
viewing people engaged in various sexual acts. Voyeurism is not 
a fundamental right. If Congress and state legislatures truly de-
sire to preserve the traditional fabric of American society for fu-
ture generations, they should adopt the most innovative and ef-
fective laws possible under our Constitution. In dealing with the 
problem of hard-core pornography, a per se rule may be neces-
sary to preserve our heritage. 
